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THE IMPORTANCE OF LIBERTY IS NOT IN ITS VALUE 
 
Gianfranco Pellegrino* 
 
Abstract 
Ian Carter defended 
Independence: Freedom has value independently of the value of the 
actions one is free to do, or of any other consequence. This value 
gives us reasons to care for freedom. 
The main purpose of this paper is a defence of the thesis that freedom's 
relevance can be fully explained in terms of the value of the actions one is free 
to do. Accordingly, Independence is false. I shall propose an alternative view, by 
arguing that in relevant cases freedom merely acts as an enabler of the value of 
the actions one is free to perform. Freedom is a condition needed to perform 
valuable actions, but it does not contribute any value to the overall value of 
states of affairs. Lacking freedom, certain actions that would be valuable when 
freely performed lose their value. 
 
Summary 
Introduction. – 1. The independent or non-specific value of liberty. − 2. 
Against the independent or non-specific value of liberty. − 3. Holism and the 
importance of liberty. − 4. The importance of liberty and its measurement. 
 
Keywords 
Freedom, value, measurement, liberalism, additivity, holism. 
                                                
*  Assistant Professor of Political Philosophy at the Department of Political Science, 
Center for Ethics and Global Politics, LUISS Guido Carli (Rome). 
 
 
Introduction 
Why does freedom matter? Does freedom has a value for its own sake? 
Or can its relevance be reduced to the valuable consequences freedom 
brings about? Is it good to be free just because, by being free, one can 
do a number of other valuable things? Or is it important to be free, no 
matter what one is going to do with such freedom? These questions 
have been frequently discussed in debates on freedom and its 
importance, and many competing claims have been made to address 
them.1 Prominently, Ian Carter and Matthew H. Kramer defended the 
following three claims: 
Independence: Freedom’s value cannot be reduced to the value of the 
actions the free person actually performs or is able to perform. 
Freedom has value independently of the value of the actions one is 
free to do, or of any other consequence. This value gives us reasons 
to care for freedom.2 
Measurement: Freedom can be measured. Freedom is a quantitative 
attribute of agents, whose extent can be determined with sufficient 
precision.3 
Symmetry: There is a symmetry between the value and the extent of 
freedom. Freedom’s extent determines its value. A greater freedom 
has greater value.4 
The main purpose of this paper is to defend the thesis that while 
freedom does matter, it has no value in itself. Freedom's relevance can 
be fully explained in terms of the value of the actions one is free to do. 
Accordingly, Independence is false. Or at least, this is what I am going to 
argue. In particular, I am going to put forward, and defend, the 
following view: 
Importance: Freedom is important because it enables other valuable 
features to contribute their value to the overall value of states of 
 
affairs. The greater the freedom the agent has, the greater the value of 
other valuable features of her life. 
In doing this, I don’t reject Measurement. Neither am I denying that 
there could be ways of measuring how much freedom an agent has, nor 
am I dismissing the relevance of providing a view of the measurement 
of freedom. Indeed, I am assuming a simplified version of Carter's view 
on measurement. In particular, I am going to assume that: 
a. Being free is (among other things) to have options — i.e. combinations of 
compossible available (i.e. unconstrained) actions. Call this assumption 
freedom as options;5 
b. The wider the extent of the combinations of options open to an agent is (the 
higher the proportion of conceivable compossible actions he is not 
prevented from performing), the greater the freedom one has. Call this 
assumption the measure of freedom;6 
Carter suggests that freedom’s value is non-specific: the value of 
freedom cannot be reduced to the value of specific freedoms to 
perform valuable actions. In what follows, I shall use Carter’s label 
‘non-specific value’ to refer to the value of liberty according to 
Independence.7 
At the end of this paper, I consider Symmetry. It shall try to show that 
if Independence is false, then Symmetry is false, too. But whereas I provide 
a set of objections against Independence, my only challenge to Symmetry 
will be a side effect of the arguments against Independence. If Independence 
is false, and freedom has no value, then it cannot be the case that 
greater freedom has greater value. If so, Symmetry is false, or it is at least 
in need of qualification. 
I proceed as follows. In § 1, I sketch an argument in favour of 
Independence. In § 2, I provide objections against Independence. In § 3, I 
propose an alternative view, by arguing that in relevant cases freedom 
merely acts as an enabler of the value of the actions one is free to 
perform. In other words, freedom is a condition needed to perform 
valuable actions, but it does not contribute any value to the overall 
value of states of affairs.8 Lacking freedom, certain actions that would 
 
be valuable when freely performed lose their value. However, this does 
not mean that freedom has value. Freedom merely enables value. It is a 
condition of value, not a ground for it. My general contention is that only 
this view of the relevance of freedom is able to account for relevant 
considered judgements on the matter. Finally, in § 4, I tackle Symmetry. 
1. The independent or non-specific value of liberty 
Consider 
The Two Communists – Vasilij and Rose are two Communists living in 
the 70ies. Vasilij lives in Moscow under a dictatorial regime. Being in 
perfect agreement with the official doctrine of the Party, he does not 
feel any sense of coercion, and he is perfectly happy with his life. 
Rose, instead, lives in New York, in a liberal-democratic society. She 
is a member of the Communist Party, and entirely devotes her free 
time to propaganda. Like Vasilij, Rose does not feel any sense of 
coercion, and she is perfectly happy with her life in New York.9 
You may say that Rose and Vasilij led equally valuable lives, because 
they could both do what they preferred.10 Rose reached a valuable end 
by using as a means the liberty she enjoyed in US in the 1970s, whereas 
Vasilij did not need to use other means, as achievement of the valuable 
end was his only option. But this difference does not bear on the value 
of their lives. Both Rose and Vasilij reached the same valuable end, 
after all. As a consequence, their lives should have the same value. 
Vasilij’s and Rose’s life can be represented as two sets of options, 
where S(Rose) is the set of options open to Rose, and S(Vasilij) is the 
set available to Vasilij (letters stand for options): 
Figure 1 
S(Rose) a, b, c , d, e, f, g, h, i, l 
S(Vasilij) c  
 
 
Assume that: 
i .  c  is the option consisting in being a Communist. 
i i .  c  is the only valuable option. Options a, b, d, e, f, g, h, i, l are valueless 
− i.e. neither valuable nor worthless.  
The suggestion that Rose and Vasilij led equally valuable lives brings 
about 
Ranking 1 .  S(Rose) = S(Vasilij) 
where ‘=’ means ‘as good as’. Many (if not most) people will find 
Ranking 1 counter-intuitive.11 Like Vasilij, Rose believes in 
Communism, and prefers to be an activist more than anything else. 
Assuming that satisfaction of subjective preference is a valuable 
achievement, then Vasilij gets something valuable. But it seems 
plausible to say that being a freer life, Rose’s life is better than Vasilij’s 
life. If so, even when both agents achieve the same valuable end, the 
freer agent lives a better life. Or at least, this seems a plausible view.12 
This view brings about 
Ranking 2 .  S(Rose) > S(Vasilij). 
where ‘>’ means ‘better than’. Now, consider the following argument: 
Argument I 
1. Ranking 2 is more plausible than Ranking 1 . 
2. Considered Judgments as Prima Facie Evidence (from now onwards CJE): 
Philosophical theses gain (part of their) support from their capacity to 
account for plausible considered judgements. Coherence with many 
plausible considered judgements is prima facie evidence in favour of a 
given thesis, and contradiction with respect to plausible considered 
judgements gives prima facie evidence against it.13 
3. In virtue of the assumption i i . above, so far as the value of options is 
concerned, Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives are equally good. 
 
4. Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives differ as to freedom. In virtue of definition 
b. above, Rose’s life is a a freer life, because it contains a wider extent 
of options. 
5. No Difference in Value without Differential Factors (from now onwards 
NVD): a. the value of something results from certain features of that 
thing and/or the context where that thing is placed (the value of a 
rare book results from the fact that there are not many similar books 
in the world where it exists); then, b. if two things are different for 
their value they should be different in other features (difference in 
value results from differences in other features. Assume that pleasant 
things are good. If so, equally pleasant foods, for instance, should be 
equally good).14 
6. Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives differ in their value because they differ in the 
extent of freedom contained in each of them. Their difference in 
value results from their difference in freedom (in virtue of 1., 4. and 
5.). 
7. Contributed Value (from now onwards CV): When a feature grounds 
overall value (when the overall value of a state of affairs results from 
such a feature), it does so by contributing its value to the overall value. 
8. In Rose’s life, freedom contributes its value to the overall value, 
thereby making Rose’s life better than Vasilij’s one (in virtue of 6. and 
7.). 
9. In Rose’s life, freedom has value but there is no difference in the 
value of available options (in virtue of 3. and of assumption ii.) . Call 
the value of freedom freedom-value, whereas the value of options is 
called option-value. In Rose’s life, freedom-value does not result from 
option-value (in virtue of 5.). Accordingly, freedom-value should 
result from the extent of available options (thereby confirming the 
definitions provided in a. and b.), i.e. from the mere being freedom 
of the freedom present in Rose’s life.15 The value of the valuable 
option in Rose’s life results from its features, whereas the fact that 
Rose has a given number of (valuable or not valuable) options 
grounds the value of her freedom. 
10. Freedom’s value is independent of the value of the options open to 
the agent. Freedom’s value is non-specific. 
10. is Independence and Argument I provides its support. 
 
 
2. Against the independent or non-specific value of liberty 
Independence seems to account for plausible judgments on cases such as 
The Two Communists. Indeed, this thesis is originally motivated by the fact 
that it seems to account for our considered judgements on the value of 
liberty (i.e. for the intuition that, ceteris paribus, it is better to have more 
options than fewer). However, there are cases where Independence actually 
runs against plausible judgments, thereby failing to meet the requirement 
established in CJE (which is premise 2. in Argument I).  
Consider: 
Three Lives – Ludwig is a gifted pianist. He played piano since he was 
five. He didn’t choose this; he was simply put in front of a piano 
when he was barely able to understand what a musical instrument is. 
He did not know whether he could have preferred a different kind of 
life. Simply, for him, it is impossible to think about a different way of 
living. Surely, his life is rewarding and rich. However, it is not clear 
that this is the life he would have chosen if he were free to choose. 
Franz is a violinist. He is quite gifted, but his life was less 
straightforward than Ludwig’s. Being the son of poor Austrian peasants, 
he arrived late to music, and his musical talent emerged only when he 
was relatively old. However, he was devoured by the love for music, he 
chose an artistic life and in few years he made giant steps, becoming an 
acclaimed performer. To be true, he is less gifted than Ludwig, and less 
precocious, and a part of his life was dominated by valueless actions. 
Wolfgang is a slacker, whose survival entirely depends on welfare. He 
is in this sad predicament after a series of failures, in a number of 
bizarre enterprises he embarked on. He arrived there through a 
succession of perfectly free choices, ‘he freely flit from one passion to 
another,’ (Hurka 2011a, 141) and as a consequence he is having a 
wholly pointless life. 
If Ludwig’s, Franz and Wolfgang’s lives are represented as different 
sets of options, Independence would produce the following: 
Ranking 3 .  [S(Wolfgang)= S(Franz)]> S(Ludwig) 
 
Ranking Wolfgang’s life higher than Ludwig’s one on account of the 
fact that it is a freer life seems implausible. The same holds for the 
claim that Franz life has the same value as Wolfgang’s one. Independence 
implies that Ludwig’s life is valueless, while Franz and Wolfgang’s life 
have the same value. This seems counter-intuitive. 
It seems more plausible that both Franz and Ludwig’s lives are 
better than Wolfgang’s life. This is so even if one claims that Franz life 
is better than Ludwig’s life, because the former is freer than the latter. 
This view can be expressed in the following: 
Ranking 4 .  S(Franz) > S(Ludwig) > S(Wolfgang) 
But Independence cannot account for Ranking 4 , and then it fails to meet 
CJE. Let’s call this the intuition objection. 
It might be objected that Three Lives is only a specific case, perhaps 
not very frequent and so irrelevant. Cases such as the The Two Communists 
are much more frequent, and Independence seems to account for our 
intuitive response to this sort of cases. In other words, even though 
Independence originates seemingly counter-intuitive judgements in some 
specific cases, it provides support for the general idea that a freer life is 
better than a less free life − and this general idea is obviously plausible.  
However, Independence yields systematically implausible conclusions. If 
applied generally, Independence cannot but lead to counterintuitive 
judgements on the value of different lives, or sets of options. Consider 
the following sets of options: 
Figure 2 
S(1) a, b, c , d, e, f, g, h, i, l 
S(2) c  
S(3) m, n, o, p 
 
S(4) b, d, e 
S(5) c , d 
S(6) a, b 
Assume that c  is a valuable option, whereas the other options have no 
value. Independence suggests the following ranking: 
Ranking 5 .  S(1) > S(3) > S(4) > [(S5) = (S6)]> S(2) 
In terms of option-value, S(3), S(4), and S(6) have no value — they are 
valueless. However, in terms of freedom-value, S(1), S(3) and S(4) are better 
than S(5) and S(6), which in their turn are both better than S(2), because 
in them the agent has a greater range of available actions. Ranking 5  
shows that, according to Independence, freedom-value diverges from, and is 
independent of, option-value, as sets like S(3), S(4) and S(6), which 
contain only valueless options, still have more freedom-value than S(2), 
which includes a valuable option — indeed, the only valuable one. 
The independence of freedom-value from option-value established in 
Ranking 5  may be regarded as a virtue, as it ensures freedom’s non-
specific value. But Ranking 5 annihilates option-value, as it were. It zeroes 
up its contribution to the overall value of sets of options. This cannot be 
the case, because the value of options should have (at least) some impact 
on the overall value of the sets containing them. Even assuming that 
freedom has value independently of the value of options, the fact that a 
set of options contains a valuable option should make a difference. 
Against Ranking 5 the following argument can be employed: 
Argument II 
 S(5)=S(6) is false, because S(5) and S(6) have different features — S(5) 
contains one valuable option, S(6) contains only valueless options. In 
virtue of NVD, sets of options having different features should also 
be different in value. 
 
 S(5) > S(6) is true, as S(5) contains (at least) one valuable option (this 
is again a conclusion deriving from NVD). 
 if S(5) >S(6), it cannot be irrational to claim that S(2)> S(6) — after 
all, S(2) also contains one valuable option.  
Argument II produces the following ranking: 
Ranking 6 . S(1) > S(5) > S(2) >[S(3) = S(4) = S(6)] 
Ranking 6 takes into account both freedom- and option-value, and 
it seems more plausible than Ranking 5 . But it cannot be produced by 
Independence. If freedom has merely non-specific value (and Independence is 
true), then it seems that S(2) cannot be ranked higher than any other 
sets in Figure 2. In Ranking 5 , the non-specific value of freedom 
zeroes up the impact of option-value on the overall value of sets of 
options. Freedom-value greedily erodes any other form of value. For 
this reason, it cannot provide an accurate representation of the overall 
value of sets of options and states of affairs. Let’s call this the greediness 
objection. 
Consider now the following sets of options, where c  again is the 
only valuable option: 
Figure 3 
S(7) a, b, c , d, e, f, g, h, i, l 
S(8) c  
S(9) f, g, h, i, l 
S(10) a, b, d, e 
S(11) c , d 
S(n) m, o, p, …, n 
 
According to Independence, S(n) is the best set. However, Sn contains only 
valueless options. But Sn is better than S(7) and, above all, it is better 
than S(8). Indeed, it is far better than these sets of options (I am 
assuming that it contains a huge number of options). If one should 
choose between S(7) and Sn, Sn should be chosen — at least for 
supporters of Independence.16 
From what said so far it follows that a set containing a valuable 
option may be less valuable than any other set including only valueless 
options. So, if Independence is true, then we have reasons to prefer sets 
containing only valueless options over states of affairs where there are 
valuable options. This idea can be stated as follows: 
Liberal Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible set of options containing 
one or more valuable options, there must be another larger set 
containing only valueless options whose freedom-value, if other 
things are equal, overrides the option-value of the former set, thereby 
making the latter more valuable overall than the former. 
The liberal repugnant conclusion is paradoxical.17 Independence seems to 
suggest that larger sets of valueless options should be systematically 
preferred to smaller sets containing valuable options, because of the 
greater freedom contained in those sets.18 This cannot be true. I shall 
call this the liberal repugnance objection. 
Taken together, the greediness objection and the liberal repugnance 
objection go against Independence, and they corroborate the intuition 
objection. It seems that Independence accounts only for some intuitions, 
but at the price of going against other equally plausible, and more 
general, judgements. Accordingly, Independence goes against CJE, and it 
loses the support given by Argument I. Indeed, this argument can now 
work against the thesis, not in its favour. 19 Claiming that freedom has 
value as such is not what is needed to account for our considered 
judgments, but it is rather a premise from which very implausible 
judgements follow. 
 
 
3. Holism and the importance of liberty 
Let’s come back to Three Lives. It seems that the most plausible 
judgement about this case is as follows: Franz life is the best one, 
because he freely achieved valuable ends; Ludwig’s life, despite its 
achievements, is worse because it lacks the remarkable liberty shown in 
Franz’s life; Wolfgang’s life is valueless. (This is Ranking 4 above.) 
The problem with Independence is that it cannot account for this 
judgment. This inability spreads over in general, producing many 
implausible judgments, whose shape is represented in the greediness 
and the liberal repugnance objections. Independence cannot account for 
the value of options in certain lives, nor can it avoid bloating the value 
of freedom, till the point of declaring certain freer, but option-valueless 
lives, better than less free, but option-valuable lives. 
I think that this impasse depends on a premise employed in Argument 
I, and in particular on premise 7, i.e. CV. This premise expresses the 
idea that whenever the presence of a given feature affects the value of a 
state of affairs, then this feature contributes its value to the overall state 
of affairs. In other words, any feature whose presence affects the 
overall value of a state of affairs is a ground of this value, a value-making 
feature. 
However, CV can be challenged. Consider 
Bad Pleasures − Dick is an acute and sophisticate moralist. He has a 
penetrating capacity to discern morally relevant features in complicate 
daily life situations. Most of times, he can indicate the right solution 
for intricate cases. But he is perverse: he is delighted in acting 
wrongly. He identify the right thing to do, and then does the 
opposite. In this way, he gains for himself the most exquisite 
pleasures.20 
Assume that Bad Pleasures is plausible, and assume that, in general, 
enjoyment is valuable. Then, the fact that someone is delighted, or feels 
pleasure, is a value-making feature.21 But in Bad Pleasures this is 
obviously not the case. The pleasures that Dick gets from his wrong-
 
doing are bad pleasures; they cannot be good things. Nevertheless, in 
many other cases, pleasures are good, and plausibly so.22 Indeed, in Bad 
Pleasures, Dick’s enjoyment makes his wrong-doing even worse: the fact 
that he enjoys his mischievous acts makes his conduct even more 
wrong than similar acts performed by someone who does not enjoy 
doing them. 
If this account of what is going on in Bad Pleasures is correct, then we 
have to explain two things. First, we have to explain why a feature that 
usually is good (i.e. enjoyment) turned out to be a bad one, and second 
we have to explain why this makes things worse. 
There are at least two general explanations we could appeal to. 
According to the  
Additive View: The overall value of a state of affairs is the net 
balance resulting from adding up the separate values of its valuable 
features.  
On this view, each feature of a state of affairs makes a contribution, 
whether positive or negative, to the overall value of the state of affairs. 
Each feature adds its (positive or negative) independent value to the 
overall value, and the overall value is the result of summing the values 
(or disvalues) of different features.23 In Bad Pleasures, the additive view 
would suggest that the value of enjoyment is outweighed by the 
disvalue of wrongdoing, and this explains why we have the feeling that 
Dick’s pleasures are bad ones. To be true, they are not bad, but their 
goodness is overbalanced by the badness of Dick’s wrongs. 
However, this story fails to explain the intuition that Dick’s 
pleasures increase the badness of his wrongs. Which feature in the 
situation is contributing the added disvalue that we feel is resulting 
from Dick’s perverse delight? Of course, one can invoke many other 
features, enriching the picture. For instance, it might be claimed that 
Dick’s pleasure are undeserved, and that the missing fit between 
enjoyment and merit is what adds disvalue to the wrongs committed by 
Dick. Or it might be claimed that Dick’s wrongs are producing 
 
somebody’s distress and that there is an unfair division of pleasures and 
pains where the wrongdoer is delighted at the expense of the suffering 
of innocent victims. All these factors — unfairness, innocence, and so 
on — may be contributing to the overall value of the state of affairs 
described in Bad pleasures, and the overall badness of it might be the 
result of these complex contributions. 
The Additive view relies on a general thesis in value theory that can 
be stated as follows: 
Universality: Any factor contributing as a part to the value of a whole 
keeps its value when moved into a different whole.24 
I think that Universality is false, and as a consequence the Additive view 
is false too. Or at least I think this view is false of our phenomenology 
of value. When considering Bad pleasures we do not think that pleasures 
are good even in this case, but their goodness has been overbalanced by 
the badness of Dick’s wrongdoing, and that their being something good 
going to someone not deserving it adds a badness to the already 
existing disvalue. We more simplistically think that those pleasures are 
bad ones, and that this is the reason for which they should not be 
experienced. Dick is liable to punishment for his wrongs, but for many 
of us he is liable to an extra blame for his pleasures in acting wrongly. I 
think this view cannot be accounted by the Additive view and 
Universality. 
The Additive view and Universality are assumed in Independence. 
Premise 7 in Argument I sounds as follows: 
Contributed Value: When a feature grounds value (when value results from it), 
it does so by contributing its value to the overall value. 
CV can be interpreted as the idea that overall value comes from 
summing up the particular (positive and negative) contributions of the 
specific features of a given state of affairs. This is the Additive view. As 
already said, this view rests on the further claim that any factor keeps its 
value in whatever context it is. Recall the judgment that Independence 
 
produced if applied to Three Lives. Franz life is the best, and is equal in 
value to Wolfgang’s life, whereas Ludwig’s life is the worst. This 
judgement can be explained in terms of the Additive view. Franz life is 
the best, because its value is the sum of the positive contribution of the 
value of freedom and the value of Franz achievements as an artist. 
However, Wolfgang’s life, despite lacking achievements similar to Franz 
life, contains a great extent of liberty, whose value compensates for any 
missing achievement. The achievements in Ludwig’s life cannot 
overbalance the disvalue of missing liberty, and this makes his life the 
worst ones. Freedom, then, keeps its value in each of those lives, and its 
value contributes to the overall value of them. 
I think that this explanation has the same shortcomings of some of 
the explanations of Bad Pleasures given above. When considering 
Wolfgang’s life we have the intuition of being in front of a completely 
wasted life. The fact that Wolfgang was free does not make it good. 
Indeed, the fact that he freely wasted his life adds something bad to it. 
But the Additive view and Universality would not explain what’s wrong 
with Wolfgang’s life so easily. Of course, also in this case we can make 
appeal to further factors, whose contribution turn the balance. For 
instance, it might be argued that a bad use of liberty strains the point of 
liberty itself, and that the disvalue coming from badly using a good 
thing could explain why we think Wolfgang’s life is worse than 
Ludwig’s one. After all, Wolfgang misused something good, whereas 
Franz was simply devoid of this good in his life. But misusing the good 
is worse than not having it. 
However, my reaction here is similar to the one I voiced when 
considering Bad Pleasures. In considering Three Lives, we are thinking that 
Wolfgang’s life is the worst on account of his liberty, and not despite it. 
Independence, the Additive view and Universality cannot account for this. 
Consider a different general view of value: 
Holistic View: The overall value of something derives both from the value 
contributed by its valuable features and from the presence of other 
enabling and disabling features. 
 
This view rests on a distinction between features that have value, and 
contribute their value to the overall value of state of affairs, and 
features with no value, but whose presence enables or disables 
(intensifies or weakens) the contribution of valuable features. This 
distinction might be grasped by considering the following example. A 
specific sort of comradely jokes is one of the good things of a 
friendship. Indeed, you may say that complicity in these kinds of (often 
silly) jokes is a marking feature of friendship. Complicity in these things 
makes friendship good. It may be thought that a ‘cold’ friendship, 
where these jokes never occur, has less value for this very reason. 
Obviously, those jokes may be less funny, and sometimes even nasty 
and offensive, when told to people who are not your friends. Those 
jokes are such that the ground of their being funny is the presence of 
the butt and the friendly relations between the butt and the author of 
the joke. These jokes increase what is good in friendship, even though 
they are not good outside the friendship. 
It might be claimed that in cases of this sort we have features whose 
presence enables the value of other features, whose value in its turn 
contribute to the overall value of the state of affairs. The presence of 
the butt, and the joke to be cracked, have no value in their own. But 
their existence enables some valuable features of friendship —
camaraderie, mutual trust, lack of aggressive attitudes — to be activated 
and to make friendship the good thing that it is. Alternately, it might be 
said that these sorts of joke intensify the already existing value of 
camaraderie, which can be expressed in many other ways, of course, but 
is particularly apparent when these jokes are told, and enjoyed.25 
If applied to Bad Pleasures, the Holistic view would suggest the 
following. Dick’s wrongs disable his pleasures from being good as they 
would be in other situations. Dick’s pleasures intensify the badness of 
his wrongs. Dick’s pleasures, then, are not value-making features: their 
presence is neither good nor bad, but it is rather able to make worse 
Dick’s wrongdoing. This view accounts for our considered judgement 
that pleasures in cases such as Bad Pleasures are not valuable, and that 
their presence makes worse what is happening, as compared to a case 
when the wrongdoer does not enjoy his misdeeds. 
 
I claim that the Holistic view applies in many cases, even though not 
necessarily in all.26 In particular, I submit that the Holistic view is the 
best way to describe cases in which freedom seems to have value as 
such. Let’s come back to the two stories considered in this paper. In the 
Two Communists the most plausible judgment is that Rose’s life is better 
than Vasilij’s. It seems that this is the case on account of Rose’s 
freedom in choosing to be a Communist in the 1970s US. However, if 
we compare Vasilij’s life (and Ludwig’s one) to Wolfgang’s life, it seems 
that despite lack of freedom, Vasilij’s life is not wasted, or not as much 
as Wolfgang’s one. But if freedom has always a value, and its value 
cannot be reduced to the value of the achievements, then these 
judgments cannot be accepted. For Wolfgang’s life cannot be wasted, as 
it contains more freedom than Vasilij’s and Ludwig’s lives. This is what 
suggests Independence. 
But it might be suggested that freedom acts as an enabler or an 
intensifier of the value of certain options. The mere presence of 
freedom — the mere presence of a great extent of options — makes 
valuable (or more valuable) certain options. Many of us think that 
certain options are better if they can be freely chosen, and that the 
difference between Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives lies exactly in the fact that 
Rose (but not Vasilij) was able to choose to be a Communist. This 
intuition can be explained by claiming that freedom intensifies the value 
of options, or that it enables already valuable options to contribute their 
value. Accordingly, Wolfgang’s life is worse because the already existing 
badness of his choices has been made worse by liberty. Vasilij’s life is 
worse than Rose’s, because the value contained in it is blocked by the 
absence of liberty. And so on. 
The holistic view, applied to freedom, can give rise to the following 
claim: 
Importance: Freedom is important because it enables other valuable features 
to contribute their value to the overall value of states of affairs. The greater 
the freedom the agent has, the greater the value of other valuable features 
of her life. 
 
Importance can account for the most plausible judgements in many of the 
cases described in this paper. Consider again  
Figure 2 
S(1) a, b, c , d, e, f, g, h, i, l 
S(2) c  
S(3) m, n, o, p 
S(4) b, d, e 
  
S(5) c , d 
S(6) a, b 
Importance would produce 
Ranking 6 . S(1) > S(5) > S(2) > [S(3) = S(4) = S(6)] 
which plausibly ranks sets with freedom over the set with a valuable 
option and over option-valueless sets. Similar outcomes would result 
from applying Importance to Figure 3.27 These rankings are more 
plausible than those produced by Independence. This is a prima facie 
evidence in favour of Importance and the view it conveys. 
Relying on the Holistic view, Importance discards CV. It is not the 
case that freedom always contributes its value to the overall value, and 
this for two reasons: because in general overall value does not derive 
from additive contributions of fixed valuable factors, and because 
freedom has no value as such, but it rather enables (or disables) 
different valuable things. Importance could be supported by Argument I 
in an amended form, i.e. without premise 7.28 
 
It might be objected that Importance is a reductive view of the value 
of liberty, because it reduces the value of liberty to its being a means to 
other valuable things. Carter repeatedly argues that any view of this sort 
is wrong, because in many cases we feel that freedom’s relevance 
cannot be wholly explained in terms of its valuable consequences.29 
However, Importance can avoid this charge. Saying that freedom enables 
the value of options, or of any other valuable things, does not amount 
to claiming that freedom is a means to bring about those valuable 
consequences. In the friendship example discussed above, the joke is 
not a means to bring about friendship, but rather a feature able to give 
friendship its value (or to increase its value). Likewise, freedom is not a 
means to a well-rounded life, but rather a condition able to making it 
possible.30 
4. The importance of liberty and its measurement 
As said at the outset, Carter and Kramer defended the following claims: 
Independence: Freedom’s value cannot be reduced to the value of the 
actions the free person actually performs or is able to perform. 
Freedom has value independently of the value of the actions one is 
free to do, or of any other consequence., and this value gives us 
reasons to care for freedom. 
Measurement: Freedom can be measured. Freedom is a quantitative 
attribute of agents, whose extent can be determined with sufficient 
precision. 
Symmetry: There is a symmetry between the value and the extent of 
freedom. Freedom’s extent determines its value. A greater freedom 
has greater value. 
In this paper, I rejected Independence. This has no impact on Measurement. 
Indeed, I assumed that freedom can be measured, or at least that it 
amounts to having an extent of options open. 
However, Importance affects Symmetry. Indeed, it forces a qualification. 
The reasoning is simple. If freedom is an enabler of other valuable 
 
things, then the relevant difference is between cases when there is 
freedom and cases where freedom lacks. The measure of freedom has 
no impact on the overall value. Symmetry suggests that the value of 
freedom increases with the measure of freedom. This view aimed at 
expressing the idea that it is ceteris paribus better to have greater freedom 
than less.  
Importance makes this idea less plausible, even though not completely 
wrong. Freedom is having options (this is definition a.). If so, a life with 
many options is a freer life. Symmetry would suggest that any freer life is, 
by being freer, ceteris paribus more valuable. Importance suggests that a 
freer life is not by the very definition more valuable. But a life 
containing more valuable options is better than a life containing less 
valuable options, of course. And it is a freer life. Then, some freer lives 
are better than some less free lives. Consider 
Figure 4 
S(12) a, b, c , d, e, f, g, h, i, l 
S(13) c  
S(14) m, n, o, p 
S(15) b, c, e 
S(n) m, o, p, …, n 
Applied to Figure 4, Independence would produce 
Ranking 9 . S(n) > S(12) > S(14) > S(15) > S(13), 
whereas Importance would suggest 
Ranking 10 . S(12) > S(15) > [S(13) = [S(14) = S(n)]. 
 
I think Ranking 10 is more plausible than Ranking 9 . Importance 
would require a qualification of Symmetry, thereby obtaining the 
following: 
Quasi-symmetry: Whenever valuable options are at stake, there is a 
symmetry between the value and the extent of freedom. Freedom’s 
extent determines the overall value of valuable state of affairs. A 
greater freedom makes more valuable already valuable options. 
The main intuition underlying the view that freedom is a quantitative 
attribute and it has a value that is not reducible to the value of the 
options the agent has, can be stated as follows. There are freer lives, 
and these lives are better simply because freer, and not only because 
they permit other valuable consequences. I think this intuition can be 
kept by claiming that freedom is a necessary condition in order that 
certain valuable options contribute their value to the state of affairs 
containing them. Less formally, the claim is that being free to act is 
better than being unfree, when one’s options are independently 
valuable, whereas free wrongdoing is worse than coerced wrongs, and 
freedom applied to trifles is pointless. This is a more complicated 
wisdom that straightforward praise for the value of freedom. But it 
seems to be more true to facts.31 
 
Notes 
1 See (Carter, Kramer, and Steiner 2007a; Carter, Kramer, and Steiner 2007b; Dworkin 
1982). 
2 Independence could be spelled out in at least two different ways. According to  
Final Value: Freedom has value for its own sake, i.e. as an end in itself, independently 
of any further consequence that being free could have. 
By contrast, according to the  
Non-specific Instrumental Value: Freedom has non-specific instrumental value, i.e. it has value 
as a means to several possible ends, but its value is independent of the value of any 
specific end among those served. 
The Final value thesis has been defended in (Hurka 2011, 143–9); see also (Carter 
1999, 42–5, 58–9, 61). the Non-specific instrumental value thesis has been defended 
at length by (Carter 1999, 34-5, 44-5, 69;  2009, 167–9). 
3 See (Carter 1999, 3-5, 21, 31, 36, 171). Despite their agreement on Measurement, 
Carter and Kramer have different views about how liberty is to be measured. See 
(Carter 1999, chap. 7-8; Kramer 2003, chap. 5). 
4 See (Carter 1999, 11; 2005, 48, 52). To be true, the three thesis are logically 
connected, according to Carter; see (Carter 1999, 169). I shall say something on this 
connection in § 4 below. 
5 See (Carter 1999, 15, 180-1). I am using ‘options’ to refer to combinations of 
available actions. I am not assuming that freedom coincides with freedom of choice. I 
am focusing on freedom tout court, not on freedom on choice. On this topic, see 
(Carter 2005, chap. 3). 
6 See (Carter 1999, 7, 15, 28, 173, 182). 
7 See (Carter 1999, 32-7). Notice that Carter does not state Independence. However, 
Independence subsumes under itself many theses that he defends and accepts; see in 
particular (Carter 1999, 33-4). Carter distinguishes between the specific freedom to do 
specific things and the freedom one has when it is considered independently of any 
specific thing the agent is free to do. The latter he defines ‘overall freedom’. Overall 
freedom is the amount of specific freedoms a given agent has, to be obtained by 
aggregating over the specific freedoms she has. Specific freedoms have value only in 
so far as the actions they allow are valuable, whereas a given amount of overall 
freedom, according to Carter, can have value independently of the value of the 
specific freedoms constituting it, namely independently of the value of the specific 
actions the agent having a given amount of overall freedom can perform. See (Carter 
1999, 4, 11, 15-6, 28). Independence concerns overall freedom. In the main text, I am 
assuming the distinction between specific freedoms and overall freedom, despite not 
focusing explicitly on it. Anything I shall say here is to be understood as concerning 
overall freedom. Also, in this paper I shall not give detailed consideration to Matthew 
H. Kramer’s views on these same topics. Despite thinking that many of my claims 
applies also to Kramer’s view of the non-specific value of freedom, here I shall not 
produce detailed evidences for this view.  
8 Among value theorists, there are considerable disagreements about what sorts of 
things can have value. Here, I shall try to remain agnostic on this. I shall 
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interchangeably use different languages — namely, I shall say both that actions and 
freedom have value and that the states of affairs where someone is free to, and 
performs, certain actions have value. Often, I shall also make reference to the fact that 
one is free or that she performs a given action. I shall not tackle the metaphysical 
issue concerning whether or not actions can be reduced to states of affairs or whether 
or not facts and states of affairs coincide. 
 In addition, I am assuming that the features of a given state of affairs concur to give 
it its value. This may happen either because those features have value in their own, 
and their value contributes to the overall value of the state of affairs, or because they 
enable other features of the state of affairs to contribute their value. On this 
dichotomy between grounds for value and their enablers, see below § 3. Finally, with 
the locution 'overall value' I shall refer to the value of a state of affairs as it is 
determined by the (positive or negative) contribution of the value of each features of 
it. Cp. (Kagan 1988). 
9 Inspiration for this story is drawn from (Lethem 2013). 
10 I am here assuming that doing what one prefers is at least prima facie valuable. 
Nothing in my reasoning depends on this assumption, though. It might be assumed 
that Rose and Vasilij both led equally valuable lives, the value of their lives being 
independent of their actual preferences. 
11 On the relevance of intuitions about freedom, see (Carter 1999, 17–8, 95-100, 104-
7, 111-4) ⁠. 
12 See for instance (Hurka 2011, 140, 141). 
13 On this principle of justification, see (Cappelen 2012). 
14 For an early proponent of this, now quite shared, doctrine, see (Ewing, 1929, 166: 
'the value of something cannot be different except as the result of some other 
difference'). On the idea of value resulting from features of the valuable thing, and on 
the difference between resultance and supervenience, see (Dancy 2000, 140; 1981, 367; 
1993, 73). See also (Moad 2007) 
15 See (Carter 2009, 167) for the formulation in terms of “the being freedom’ of 
freedom. 
16 Applied to Figure 3, Independence would produce  
Ranking 7 .S(n) > S(7) > S(9) > S(10) > S(11) > S(8) 
A more plausible ranking would be 
Ranking 8 .  S(7) > S(11) > S(8) > [S(9) = S(10) = S(n)] 
17 See (Parfit 1984, 387–90). 
18 This does not amount to saying that freedom-value overrides option-value in each 
possible world — i.e. it does not amount to claiming that freedom has non-specific 
unconditional value. I am not assuming that Independence should be committed to this. It 
might be argued that when a set of option contains worthless, i.e. bad, options, or a 
number sufficient of them, its option-disvalue can outweigh its freedom-value. As 
stated in the main text, the liberal repugnant conclusion does not cover worthless 
options, but only valueless ones. The liberal repugnant conclusion can be stated in the 
following extended form, where this is explicit: 
Extended liberal repugnant conclusion: (1) for any possible set containing one or more 
valuable options, there must be another larger set containing only valueless options 
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whose freedom-value, if other things are equal, overrides the option-value of the 
former set, thereby making the latter more valuable than the former. However, (2) it 
is not the case that for any possible set containing one or more valuable options, 
there must be another larger set containing only worthless actions whose freedom-
value overrides the action-disvalue of the former, thereby making the latter more 
valuable than the former. 
The extended liberal repugnant conclusion entails that freedom-value can be 
overridden by option-disvalue, but not by option-value — accordingly, more freedom 
is better than less whenever it does not involve the freedom to do worthless actions 
(in the latter case, freedom-value can be overridden by the badness of certain 
options). On unconditional value, see (Carter 1999: 37-41). 
It might be claimed that certain sets of options have freedom-disvalue — i.e. the 
freedom they allow involves general, non-specific costs that outweigh the benefits of 
being free; on this topic, see (Carter 1999: 61-3). Notice that the liberal repugnance 
conclusion does not amount to this claim: rather, its meaning is that freedom-value 
(i.e. the non-specific value of liberty) risks annihilating option-value (i.e. the specific 
value of certain actions, and of the specific freedoms to do them), and this 
annihilation is counter-intuitive. Accordingly, I am not denying that liberty has non-
specific value on balance, to use Carter’s language. I am rather claiming that if this is the 
case, then counter-intuitive consequences follow, and those consequences give 
sufficient support to denying that freedom has non-specific value tout court. 
Sometimes, Carter seems to be leaning towards the view that the fact of having an 
extent of (even) worthless options available is a good thing. In the language I am using 
in this paper, this is to say that freedom-value can override option-disvalue. 
Discussing a point made by Kymlicka, Carter distinguishes ’having choice’ from 
’choosing’, and maintains that having the choice to do a worthless action ’can be a 
good thing even if doing the latter would be bad’ (Carter 1999, 39) ⁠. This view 
amounts to the following version of the liberal repugnant conclusion: 
Strong liberal repugnant conclusion: For any possible set of options containing one or 
more valuable options, there must be another larger set containing only worthless 
options whose freedom-value overrides the option-disvalue of the former set, 
thereby making the latter more valuable than the former. 
It is not clear whether Carter seriously endorses the strong liberal repugnant 
conclusion (he seems to do so in his criticism of Sen’s views, see for instance Carter 
1999, 58-9), nor that such an endorsement is needed to argue in favour of Independence. 
I am not going to discuss the strong version of the liberal repugnant conclusion in this 
paper. 
19 Indeed, Independence contradicts also NVD, which is premise 5 in Argument I. This 
is shown in premise B of Argument II. 
20 Cp. (Dancy 1993, 60). See also (Price 2008). 
21 This does not necessarily imply that pleasure is the only good, as classical hedonists 
would suggest. It is sufficient that pleasure is prima facie good, and that it is one of 
many valuable things.  
22 I am not sure that this holds also for pains. Most of pains are evils, even when there 
features of the case that would make them unavoidable or necessary. Think of the 
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pains one suffers from doctors to be cured from illness, for example. Cp. (Dancy 
1993, 55–6) for a different view, and (Price 2008, 187) for this point. 
23 Cp. (Kagan 1988, 14–8). 
24 Cp. (ibid.). 
25 The example of the joke funny when the butt is present is in (Dancy 2004, 172).  
26 (Dancy 2004, chaps. 9-10) claims that the Holistic view is the true view of value, 
valid in each and every case. I don’t want to take issue on whether this stronger view 
is true. For my purposes here it is enough that the Holistic view is true in certain 
cases, and that it describes better than the Additive view the case in which freedom is 
at stake. 
27 Applied to Figure 3, the Importance thesis would produce  
Ranking 8 .  S(7) > S(11) > S(8) > [S(9) = S(10) = S(n)]. 
28 A revised version of Argument I able to support the Importance thesis could sound 
as follows: 
Argument I* 
1 Ranking 2 is more plausible than Ranking 1 . 
2 Considered judgments as prima facie evidences (from now onwards CJE): 
Philosophical theses gain (part of their) support from their capacity to 
account for plausible considered judgements. Compatibility with many 
plausible considered judgements is a prima facie evidence in favour of a 
given thesis, and contradiction with respect to plausible considered 
judgements gives a prima facie evidence against. 
3 In virtue of the assumption ii. above, so far as the value of options is 
concerned, Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives are equal. 
4 Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives differ as to freedom. Rose’s life is a a free(r) life, 
because it contains a wider extent of options. 
5 No difference in value without differential factors (from now onwards NVD): a. 
the value of a given thing result from certain features of the thing 
considered and/or the context where this thing is placed (the value of a 
rare book results from the fact that there are not many similar books in the 
world where it exists); then, b. if two things are different for their value 
they should be different as to other features (difference in values results 
from differences in other features). 
6 Rose’s and Vasilij’s lives differ in value because they differ as to the extent 
of freedom contained in them. Their difference in value results from their 
difference in freedom (in virtue of 1., 4. and 5.). 
7 Grounds and enablers: When a feature affects value (when value results from it), 
it does so either by contributing its value to the overall value or by enabling 
another feature to contribute its value. 
8 In Rose’s life, freedom enables valuable options to contribute their value to 
the overall value, thereby making Rose’s life better than Vasilij’s one (in 
virtue of 6. and 7.). 
9 The valuable option present in Rose’s life has a value because it is enabled 
by freedom, i.e. because it is one of many options. 
 
10 Freedom has no value, but it is a condition in order that other features 
contribute their value. 
29 See (Carter 1999; 2005). 
30 Carter mentions the view that freedom is a condition for the overall value of state 
of affairs in (Carter 1999, 54). He seems to consider this view as amounting to the 
idea that freedom has constitutive value, and he admits that constitutive value can be 
non-specific; see (ibid., 54-60). In the text I am suggesting that something can be a 
condition for the overall value of a state of affairs without being a valuable constituent 
of it. 
31 Michele Bocchiola helped me very much in revising the structure and the ideas of 
previous versions of this paper. Pietro Maffettone and Federico Zuolo read a previous 
version. Robert Audi gave me suggestions about the theory of value, during a 
presentation of a previous version of the paper at the University of Roma 3. 
Responsibility for the claims here defended is mine, though. 
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